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The main results of the traditional theory of private provision of public goods in the case of 
identical individuals are: 1) there exists a unique Nash equilibrium pattern of contributions in which 
everybody contributes the same amount (Bergstrom et al. [1986]); 2) this pattern is locally stable 
(Cornes [1980]). Under homothetic preferences, I show that these results generally no longer hold 
in the context of “locally enjoyed” public goods. In particular, when the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium is not the unique equilibrium pattern, it is locally unstable and there exists at least a 
locally stable asymmetric Nash equilibrium. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: PUBLIC GOODS, NASH EQUILIBRIA AND LOCAL 
INTERACTION 
It is widely accepted that Bergstrom et al. [1986] (henceforth BBV) represents one of the most 
important theoretical works on the private provision of public goods.
1 They refer to a situation in 
which N anonymous individuals have to decide how to share their personal income between 
consumption and contribution towards a public good which affects the well being of all the 
contributors in the society. Assuming that a) individuals are utility maximisers, b) individuals 
consider others’ contributions as independent of their own, c) both public good and private 
consumption are normal goods, they prove that, for any size of the population, there exists a unique 
Nash equilibrium pattern of contributions. Moreover, by using a simple adjustment process, Cornes 
[1980] (henceforth CO) proves that the unique Nash equilibrium pattern is also locally stable.
2 If we 
assume that individuals are identical in terms of both preferences and incomes, the conclusion is 
that the unique, locally stable Nash equilibrium is represented by a pattern of identical 
contributions. Let us define this pattern symmetric Nash equilibrium (henceforth SNE). 
However, in the real world, voluntary contribution regimes clearly do generate unequal 
contributions from people who are equal in objective circumstances such as preferences and 
incomes (i.e. some people free ride and some do not). How can this empirical puzzle be solved? 
One possible solution is to introduce an assumption on the altruistic attitude of individuals and 
allow it to vary across individuals.
3 An alternative solution which saves the hypothesis of identical 
preferences and incomes across individuals could consist of modifying the spatial structure assumed 
by BBV. In particular, it appears natural to ask whether the results of uniqueness and stability 
implied by the BBV model continue holding in a context in which agents who are identical in terms 
                                                 
1 The literature on the private provision of public goods counts many contributions. Including Samuelson’s seminal 
works (Samuelson [1954], [1955]), the reader can also refer to Warr [1983], Andreoni [1988], Cornes et al. [1984].  
 
2 Cornes [1980] proves local stability under a simple continuous adjustment process for a more general externalities 
model. The reader can also refer to Sandmo [1980]. 
 
3 An example is the theory of warm-glow giving. See for example Andreoni [1989], [1990], Diamond [2003].   3
of both preferences and incomes present the following characteristics: a) they differ from each other 
for the neighbourhood they belong to, and b) they enjoy the level of public good collected by the 
members of his neighbourhood.
4  
Although there are many theories which move in this direction, none of them can be considered as 
an extension of the BBV model to the context of “locally enjoyed” public goods. One of the first 
attempts to take into account the spatial localisation of public goods is Tiebout’s model of local 
expenditures (Tiebout [1956]). In this model individuals can freely move across communities which 
are endowed with a fixed quantity of some public good and which are characterised by an optimal 
community size. Communities below the optimal size try to attract new residents to lower average 
costs while communities above the optimal size do the opposite. Given this structure, the economy 
would converge autonomously towards an equilibrium since ‘[…] except when the system is in 
equilibrium, there will be a subset of consumer-voters who are discontented with the patterns of 
their community. Another set will be satisfied.’ (page 420). It is clear that the model refers to a 
totally different problem with respect the one considered by BBV. Indeed, instead of introducing 
the local structure to explain how much individuals contribute, Tiebout uses it to analyse where 
individuals decide to move to. 
More relevant for the topic of this paper is the model built by Eshel et al. [1998] (henceforth ESS). 
They adapt Ellison’s model of local interaction (Ellison [1993]) to 2 by 2 public good games. There 
are N individuals spaced around a circle. Each individual has to decide how to contribute to a public 
good which affects the well being of those who belong to his neighbourhood. Individual i ’s 
neighbourhood is composed by the first person on his right, the first person on his left and himself. 
Each individual can behave either altruistically or egoistically. An altruist contributes a quantity of 
public good which supplies one unit of utility to each member of his neighbourhood. The net cost to 
the altruist for providing that quantity of public good is expressed by a loss of utility equal to  0 > c . 
An egoist does not contribute at all and does not bear any cost. He simply enjoys the total amount of 
                                                 
 
4 For instance, the environment is a valid example of locally enjoyed public good.   4
public good supplied by the altruists. At the end of each period, each individual decides how to 
behave on the basis of a specific learning process. In particular, with probability µ  (with 
0 1 > > µ ) he imitates the behaviour of those in his neighbourhood who earned the highest payoffs 
while with probability  ) 1 ( µ −  he retains his strategy. On the basis of these assumptions, the authors 
prove that altruists can survive if they are grouped together, so that the benefits of altruism are 
enjoyed primarily by other altruists, who then earn relatively high payoffs and are imitated. 
Moreover altruists manage to survive also in the presence of mutations that continually introduce 
egoists into the population.
5 
ESS model significantly differs from BBV model for twp reasons. Firstly, ESS obtain the result of 
coexistence between high contributors and low contributors assuming that people do not perfectly 
behave as rational agents. Secondly, individuals can only decide either to contribute fixed quantity 
of public good which increases the utility of the neighbours of one unit or to contribute nothing. 
I am going to present a version of the BBV model based on the same spatial structure assumed by 
ESS. There are N individuals who are distributed around a circle. They are identical in terms of 
both preferences and incomes. Individual  j ’s neighbourhood is defined as the first k  individuals 
on his right, the first k  individuals on his left and himself. The total contribution collected within 
his neighbourhood represents the level of public good enjoyed by individual  j . Finally, individuals 
are assumed to be “traditional” utility maximisers. This simply means that, taking neighbours’ 
behaviour has given, each individual decides how to share his income between contribution and 
consumption in order to maximise his utility function. 
The main conclusion of my model is that the introduction of the assumption of “locally enjoyed” 
public goods dramatically affects both the results of uniqueness and stability of the SNE implied by 
BBV model in a context characterised by identical individuals. In particular, both these results 
continue being true in situations in which the preferences for the public good are unrealistically 
                                                 
5 The existence of an evolutionary equilibrium characterised by coexistence of altruistic and egoistic contributors is also 
implied by Bergstrom et al. [1993].   5
strong. But not otherwise, when uniqueness does not hold, all the equilibria but the SNE are 
asymmetric Nash equilibrium patterns (henceforth ANE) in which high contributors coexist with 
low contributors. Coexistence is a “natural” result in the sense that, rather than being caused by ad 
hoc assumptions either on the behaviour of agents or on their personal characteristics, it appears as 
a direct consequence of the spatial structure assumed in my model.    
The paper is organised as follows. In section II, I present the assumptions of the model. In section 
III, I prove an existence theorem for a generic size of the neighbourhood. In section IV, I study the 
conditions under which the SNE continues being unique and locally stable when individual j ’s 
neighbourhood is defined as the first individual on his left, the first individuals on his right and 
himself. In section V, I discuss a simple example which highlights the different implications of my 
model with respect those of the BBV model. Finally, in section VI, I generalise the results obtained 
in section IV to contexts characterised by larger neighbourhoods. 
 
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL: ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
Suppose that there are N individuals distributed around a circle. Individuals are identical in terms of 
both preferences and incomes. Each individual belongs to a neighbourhood. In particular, individual 
j ’s neighbourhood is defined as the first k  individuals on his right, the first k  individuals on his 
left and himself, so that  {} ) mod( ) ( ), 1 ( ),..., 1 ( , ), 1 ( ),..., 1 ( ), ( N j k j k j j j j k j k j N + − + + − − − − = . The 
preferences of individual j  are described by a homothetic utility function,  ) , (
j N j j Q c U U = , 
which is strictly increasing in both the level of private consumption,  j c , and the level of public 
good collected in his neighbourhood, 
j N Q . Note that the hypotheses on the utility function imply 
the one of normality of both public good and private consumption used by BBV in their model. Let 
us assume that 
j N Q   is an additive function of the contributions of the members of j ’s 







s N q Q                 [ 1 ]  
where  s q  is the contribution of individual s. 
Individual  j  has to decide how to share his income, I , between consumption and contribution by 
taking the contribution of his neighbours as given and by subjecting his decision to both a budget 
constraint and a non negativity constraint. Formally, if we assume that both the price for a unit of 
private consumption and the price for a unit of public good are equal to one, the decisional problem 
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Following BBV let us define  ) ( j W f  the demand function of contributor j  when he is endowed 
with total wealth  j N j j Q I W − + =  where  j N j Q −  is the total amount contributed by all the members of 
j N  but  j . It simply represents the value of public good that individual  j   would choose for 
different values of  j W  if he could ignore the non negativity constraint.
6 Given the assumption of 
homotheticity,  ) ( j W f  is linear. Then, it can be rewritten as follows: 
( ) j N j j Q I W f − + =α ) ( ’  N j ∈ ∀              [ 3 ]  
The variable α , with  1 0 < <α , represents the proportion of income an individual would like to 
contribute to the public good if nobody contributes and it basically expresses the importance of the 
public good in the utility function. 
For typical cases that model applies to, reasonable values of α  are very low. For instance, in a 
“Cobb-Douglas” utility function of the type 
α α
j N j j Q c U
− =
1 , we could expect α  to be lower than 0.5 
meaning that the private consumption is more important than the public good.   
                                                 
6 In other words,  ) ( j W f represents the Engel curve of individual  j . 
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Taking into account the non negativity constraint, we obtain the following expression which 
represents individual  j ’s best response to  j N j Q − : 
] 0 ; ) ( max[ j N j N
BR
j j j Q Q I q − − − + = α ’  N j ∈ ∀            [ 4 ]  
Let me introduce some simple definitions which will be widely used throughout the paper. 
 
DEF.1.   For  given  α ,  N ,  j N , an equilibrium is a vector of contributions  ) ,..., ( 1
e
N





j q q =  ,  N j∈ ∀ .  
 
In particular, if  N k ≥ +1 2 , then  N N j = ,  j ∀ , and the spatial structure of the economy coincides 
with the one assumed by BBV. Therefore, the SNE is the unique equilibrium pattern of the model 
and it is globally stable.  
 
DEF.2.   A plain of size m is a set of m  consecutive individuals { } N N m j j j mod mod ) 1 ( ,..., ) 1 ( , − + +  
who contribute the same share of income.  
 
DEF.3.    For a given k , a BBV community of size z  is a set of z  consecutive individuals 
{} N N z j j j mod mod ) 1 ( ,..., ) 1 ( , − + +   such that a)  k z 2 ≤   , b) individuals 
{} N N N N k z j z j k j j mod mod mod mod ) ( ,..., ) ( , ) ( ,..., ) 1 ( + + + − −  are null contributors (i.e. individuals who 
contribute nothing). 
The previous definition implies that if C  is a BBV community of size z  for a given k  and  C j∈ , 
then a) everyone else in C  is  j ’s neighbour, b) if d  is a neighbour of  j  but  C d ∉ , then he is a 




s N q Q
j .   8
In other words, for a given k , a BBV community of size z  is an “isolated” subgroup of individuals 
who enjoy the same level of public good. This means that the conclusions of the BBV model can be 
extended to each BBV community.  
Now, let us turn to the dynamic structure of the model which will be used to study the stability 
properties of the equilibrium patterns. Let us suppose that individuals adjust their contribution over 
time according to the same continuous adjustment process adopted by CO: 












= µ & ,  0 > µ              [ 5 ]  
Where µ  represents the speed of adjustment which is assumed to be same across individuals. In 
other words, individual  j  adjusts his contribution to the equilibrium level gradually over time.
7 
 
III. EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM 
Suppose that individual  j ’s neighbourhood is composed by the first k  individuals on his right, the 
first  k   individuals on his left and himself with  N k ≤ +1 2 . Given the definition of the 
neighbourhood, expression [4] becomes: 
() () () () ] 0 ); ( ) ( max[
1
) mod( ) mod(
1




+ − + − + + =
k
s
N s j N s j
k
s
N s j N s j
BR
j q q q q I q α ,  N j∈ ∀     [6] 
Regarding the existence of an equilibrium, theorem 2 presented in BBV (page 33) can be 
innocuously extended to this context. 
 
PROP.1. For  any  1 ≥ k  and for any  1 2 + ≥ k N , a Nash equilibrium exists. 
[Proof in appendix] 
 
The previous proposition does not say anything about the number and the stability properties of the 
equilibria. In the next sections, I shall show that both the properties of uniqueness and stability 
                                                 
7 Economists explain this adjustment mechanism in terms of learning process. For further information on learning 
processes in game theory see Fudenberg et al [1999].   9
significantly change when remove the assumption of globally enjoyed public goods in favour of 
local enjoyment. In particular, I shall begin with the case of  1 = k  and, after having presented a 
simple example, I will generalise the results to any  1 > k . 
 
IV. NON UNIQUENESS AND STABILITY OF THE EQUILIBRIA WHEN k=1 
When  1 = k , the best response function of individual  j  becomes: 
() () () () ] 0 ); ( ) ( max[ ) mod( 1 ) mod( 1 ) mod( 1 ) mod( 1 N j N j N j N j
BR
j q q q q I q + − + − + − + + = α ,  N j∈ ∀                [7] 
Given both the adjustment process followed by each individual (expression [5]) and expression [7], 









− + − + + =
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} ] 0 ); ( ) ( {max[
} ] 0 ); ( ) ( {max[
} ] 0 ); ( ) ( {max[
, , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,
, , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ,
, 1 , 2 , , 2 , , 1
t N t t N t t N t N
t j t j t j t j t j t j
t t t N t t N t
q q q q q I q
q q q q q I q









       [8] 
System [8] is composed by non linear differential equations of the first order. Consider the system 
without the non negativity constraint. In this case, the dynamic system becomes linear and it can be 
rewritten in matrix notation as follows: 
t N t q A I q
1 µ µα + = &              [ 9 ]  
Where 
N





N A   is important for two reasons. Firstly, since 
1
N A   is symmetric, its 
eigenvalues are all real. Secondly, since 
1
N A   is circulant, it can be diagonalised through the 
following normalized Fourier matrix 
N N





1 * =             [ 1 1 ]  
                                                 




N x circulant A ℜ ℜ ∈ − − − − − = α α 1 , 0 ,......, 0 , 1 , 1
1
terms N ) 3 ( −  10
The generic element of the matrix 
N N




k k h e w F







       [ 1 2 ]  
where  i   is the imaginary number  1 − , and  N
k i
k e w





 is  the  k -th of the N   roots of the 
cyclotomic equation  1 =
N x . These roots (sometimes called the “De Moivre Numbers”) represent 
the coordinates in the complex plane of the vertices of a regular polygon with N sides and unit 
radius. For example, when  6 = N , we have: 
 
1 w 2 w
3 w
4 w 5 w





Fig.1. the coordinates in the complex plane of the vertices of a regular polygon with 6 sides and unit radius. 
 
From the graph we have that  ) mod( ) 1 )( 1 (
1
1 , ] [ N h k
h
k k h w w F − −
−
− = = . 
The h-th eigenvalue of a circulant matrix is obtained by multiplying the first row of 
1
N A  by the h-
th column of  N F . By applying this procedure, we obtain a general expression for the eigenvalues of 
1
N A : 
1
1 1
) 1 )( 1 ( 2 ) 1 ( 2











h w w e e α α α α λ
π π
,  N h ,..., 1 =  [13] 






h w  is  the 
complex conjugate of  1 − h w .
9 Therefore, expression [13] can be rewritten as follows: 
) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) )( 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 1
1
1 1 − −
−
− − − − − − − = − − − − − = h h
N
h h h w conj w w w α α α α λ ,  N h ,..., 1 =  [14] 
                                                 
9 If  1 − h w  is real, then its conjugate is itself.   11




N Ο  be the set of values of  ) 1 ( α −  included between 0 and 1 such that at least 
one eigenvalue of 
1
N A  is null.
10 Let 
even N  and 
odd N  be the dimension of the population when the 
number of individuals is even and when it is odd respectively, with  4 ≥
even N  and  5 ≥
odd N . We 
have that: 
a)  2 / 1 min
1 = Ο even N ; 




5 1 ,..., 1 , 1 odd N a a a − − −  such 
that  ( )






[Proof in appendix] 
  
If 
1 ) 1 ( N Ο ∉ −α   and we do not consider the non negativity constraint, then the SNE in which 
everybody contributes 









2 3 ) 1 ( −
=
− −
= ,  N j∈ ∀                   [ 1 5 ]  
is the unique equilibrium of system [9]. On the other hands, if we introduce the non negativity 
constraint and we allows  ) 1 ( α −   for varying in  ) 1 , 0 ( , the SNE might lose the property of 
uniqueness. Indeed, although it is clear that, for any  ) 1 ( α −  and for any N , system [8] can have at 
most one and only one SNE pattern, there are particular conditions on  ) 1 ( α −  that  imply  (if 
satisfied) the existence of other ANE patterns. Before examining these conditions, let me introduce 
three further definitions which will be widely used in this section. 
 
                                                 
10 The cardinality of this set depends on the size of the population.   12
DEF.4.   An  “up and down” equilibrium pattern  on 
even N  individuals  is an equilibrium 








j even even even = = = = =
− + + ) mod( ) 2 ( ) mod( ) 4 ( ) mod( ) 2 ( ... if and only if 









even even even even = = = = =
− + + + ) mod( ) 1 ( ) mod( ) 5 ( ) mod( ) 3 ( ) mod( ) 1 ( ...  with  b a ≠ . 
 
DEF.5.   A  “peak and hill” equilibrium pattern on 
odd N  individuals with an upwards spike is 
an equilibrium pattern such that if the smallest local minima bare in positions  ) mod( ) 1 (
odd N j −  
and ) mod( ) 1 (





odd odd q q
) mod( ) 1 ( ) mod( ) 1 ( + − = , then the second smallest local minima are 
in positions  ) mod( ) 3 (
odd N j −  and  ) mod( ) 3 (





odd odd q q
) mod( ) 3 ( ) mod( ) 3 ( + − = , the third 
smallest local minima are in positions  ) mod( ) 5 (
odd N j −  and  ) mod( ) 5 (
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−  which constitute a plain of size 2. 
 
DEF.6.   A  “peak and hill” equilibrium pattern on 
odd N  individuals with a downwards spike 
is an equilibrium pattern such that if the smallest local minimum is in position i, then the second 
smallest local minima are in positions  ) mod( ) 2 (
odd N j −  and  ) mod( ) 2 (
odd N j +  with 
) mod( ) 2 ( ) mod( ) 2 (
odd odd N j N j q q
+ − = , the third smallest local minima are in positions  ) mod( ) 4 (
odd N j −  and 
) mod( ) 4 (
odd N j +  with 
) mod( ) 4 ( ) mod( ) 4 (
odd odd N j N j q q





































−  which constitute a plain of size 2. 
 
Now, I can state and prove under which conditions the SNE continues being the unique equilibrium 
pattern.   13
 
PROP.2. For  1 = k   and for any  4 ≥ N , the SNE is the unique equilibrium pattern of 
contributions if and only if either  2 / 1 ) 1 ( < −α  in the even case or  ( )
1 1 ) 1 ( odd N a − < −α  in the odd 
case. 
[Proof in appendix] 
 
The previous proposition states that if and only if either  2 / 1 ) 1 ( ≥ −α   in the even case or 
( )
1 1 ) 1 ( odd N a − ≥ −α  in the odd case, we can find at least an ANE pattern in addition to the SNE one. 
This result is quite counterintuitive since it suggests the existence of asymmetric equilibrium 
patterns of contribution in a world populated by individuals who are identical in terms of 
preferences and incomes. Surprisingly, even the stability properties of the equilibrium patterns 
depend on the value of  ) 1 ( α − . In particular, the following proposition states that the conditions on 
) 1 ( α −  such that the SNE is the unique equilibrium pattern coincide with those which imply its 
local stability.  
 
PROP.3. For  1 = k  and for any  4 ≥ N , the SNE pattern of contributions is stable if and only if 
either  2 / 1 ) 1 ( < −α  in the even case or  ( )
1 1 ) 1 ( odd N a − < −α  in the odd case. Moreover, there exists at 
least one ANE pattern of contributions which is locally stable if and only if 
1 ) 1 ( N Ο ∉ −α  and either 
2 / 1 ) 1 ( > −α  in the even case or  ( )
1 1 ) 1 ( odd N a − > −α  in the odd case. 
[Proof in appendix] 
 
Combining the main implications of PROP.2. and PROP.3, we can state the following corollary. 
   14
COR.1. For  1 = k   and for any  4 ≥ N , if and only if  2 / 1 ) 1 ( ≥ −α   in the even case or 
( )
1 1 ) 1 ( odd N a − ≥ −α  in the odd case, the SNE is not the unique equilibrium pattern of contributions 
and, moreover, it is locally unstable. Moreover, if and only if  2 / 1 ) 1 ( > −α  in the even case or 
( )
1 1 ) 1 ( odd N a − > −α  in the odd case and 
1 ) 1 ( N Ο ∉ −α , then it is always possible to find at least an 
ANE pattern which is locally stable. 
 
The previous corollary states that for “reasonable” values of the importance of the public good in 
the utility function, a) the main results on the SNE pattern of contributions obtained by BBV and 
CO no longer hold in a context characterised by “locally enjoyed” public goods with  1 = k , b) it is 
always possible to find at least one pattern of asymmetric contributions which represents a locally 
stable Nash equilibrium. 
Finally, the following proposition states that, when the preferences for the private consumption are 
sufficiently strong, it is always possible to identify a particular class of locally stable ANE patterns 
of contributions which are obtained by combining of BBV communities of size 1 and size 2.   
 
PROP.4. For  1 = k  and for any  4 ≥ N , if  61803 . 0 ) 1 ( ≥ −α  and 
1 ) 1 ( N Ο ∉ −α , then the generic 
combination of BBV communities of size 1 with BBV communities of size 2 which exhausts N  and 
such that it does not present two or more consecutive BBV communities of size 2 represents a 
locally stable ANE pattern. 
[Proof in Appendix] 
 
For instance, if  9 = N  and  7 . 0 ) 1 ( = −α , then the following pattern of contributions obtained by 
combining three BBV communities of size 1 with one BBV community of size 2 is a locally stable 
ANE:   15
 
12 4 35














Fig.2. A locally stable ANE when  9 = N  and  7 . 0 ) 1 ( = −α . 
  
V. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE: THE BBV MODEL VS THE “LOCALLY ENJOYED” 
PUBLIC GOODS MODEL WHEN k=1 
Consider a society of five individuals ( 5 = N ). Let us start assuming that  2 = k  so that  N N j = ,  
N j∈ ∀ , and we have the BBV model. Given the expression of 
BR
j q , we can specify the following 
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Consider the system without the non negativity constraint. In this case, we have a dynamic system 
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   [17] 
Let us indicate with 
BBV A5  the squared matrix of size 5 which appears in [17]. By imposing the 
equilibrium condition  0 =
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1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1
     [ 1 8 ]  
The eigenvalues of 
BBV A5 −  are  α λ 4 5 1 − = ,  α λ λ λ λ = = = = 5 4 3 2 . Therefore, given 
1 ) 1 ( 0 < − < α , the determinant of 
BBV A5 −  is different from zero. The previous linear system has a 
unique solution in which everybody contributes the same amount (i.e. the SNE): 





= ,   N j∈ ∀         [ 1 9 ]  
The introduction of the non negativity constraint does not add any further equilibrium pattern.  
Moreover, by evaluating the Jacobian matrix in the SNE pattern, we obtain that for  1 ) 1 ( 0 < − < α  
all the eigenvalues of 
BBV A5  (which are the eigenvalues of 
BBV A5 −  with opposite sign) are strictly 
negative. Therefore, the SNE is locally stable. 
Now, let us assume that individual  j ’s neighbourhood is defined as the first individual on his right, 
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    [20] 
Again, by imposing the equilibrium condition without considering the non negativity constraint, we 

















































































1 ) 1 ( 0 0 ) 1 (
) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 0 0
0 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 0
0 0 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 (
) 1 ( 0 0 ) 1 ( 1
     [ 2 1 ]    17
If and only if the determinant of 
1
5 A −  is different from zero, the unconstrained system has a unique 






= ,  N j∈ ∀           [ 2 2 ]    
By using equation [14], it is possible to show that the eigenvalues of 
1
5 A −  are  α λ 2 3 1 − = , 
α λ λ 61803 . 0 618 . 1 5 2 − = = , 61803 . 0 618 . 1 4 3 − = = a λ λ   and that the eigenvalues of 
1
5 A  are  the 
eigenvalues of 
1
5 A −   with opposite sign. Clearly,  { } 61803 . 0 ) 1 (
1
5
1 = − = Ο a N . If and only if 
) 1 ( ) 1 (
1
5 a − = −α , we have an infinite number of peak and hill equilibrium patterns in addiction to 
the SNE. Without considering the plain, the peak and hill equilibrium pattern with an upwards spike 
presents the highest number of local minima.
11 Among the infinite equilibrium patterns of this type 
let us consider the one in which, let us say,  0 4 2 = =
e e q q . By solving the linear system in which we 
impose these two constraints, we obtain that  I q







5 1 . Given the previous 
expressions, the best response functions of individuals 2 and 4 imply that  0 4 2 = =
e e q q  if and only if  
) 1 ( ) 1 (
1
5 a − ≥ −α . Therefore, if and only if  ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1
5 a − < −α , the SNE is the unique equilibrium 
pattern. On the contrary, if and only if  ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1
5 a − ≥ −α , the SNE is not unique and it is always 
possible to find at least an ANE pattern. For instance, the following pattern of contributions 















                                                 
11 Without considering the plain, a peak and hill equilibrium pattern with an upwards spike presents 2 local minima 
while a peak and hill equilibrium pattern with a downwards spike presents 1 local minimum.   18
Fig.3. Peak and hill equilibrium pattern with an upwards spike in  3 = j  and smallest local minima equal to zero. 
 
Now, let us turn to the stability properties of the equilibria. The Jacobian matrix in the SNE 
coincides with 
1
5 A . Therefore, the SNE is locally stable when all the eigenvalues of 
1
5 A  are strictly 
negative. This holds if and only if  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 0
1
5 a − < − < α .  If and only if  ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1
5 a − = −α , there is an 
infinite number of locally unstable peak and hill equilibrium patterns. Finally, the Jacobian matrix 
in the peak and hill equilibrium pattern with an upwards spike in  2 = j  and smallest local minima 

















− − − − −
−
− − − − −
−
− − − − −
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1 ) 1 ( 0 0 ) 1 (
0 1 0 0 0
0 ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 0
0 0 0 1 0








e q J      [ 2 3 ]  
If and only if  1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1
5 < − < − α a , all the eigenvalues of  ) (
1
5
e q J  are strictly negative and, therefore, 
the peak and hill equilibrium pattern with an upwards spike and smallest local minima equal to zero 
i s   l o c a l l y   s t a b l e .                      
 
VI. NEIGHBOURHOODS COMPOSED BY MORE THAN THREE INDIVIDUALS  (k>1) 
What happens when the size of the neighbourhood increases? Suppose that the neighbourhood of 
individual  j  is composed by the first k  individuals on his right, the first k individuals on his left 
and himself, with  1 > k  and  N k < +1 2 . In this case, the best response function of individual  j  is 
expressed by expression [6]. Given both the adjustment process stated in the assumptions and 
expression [6], we can specify the following dynamic system:   19
() () () ()
() () () ()
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    [24] 




N t q A I q µ µα + = &            [ 2 5 ]  
Where 
N
t t I q q ℜ ∈ , , & ,  ℜ ∈ α µ,  and 
 
                [ 2 6 ]  
 
By using the properties of the circulant matrix, the expression of the eigenvalues of 
k
N A  can be 

















1 Re ) 1 ( 2 1
π
α λ ,  1 ,..., 0 − = N j        [ 2 7 ]  
where  [] d Re  is the real part of the complex number d . 
Specularly to what said in section II, if 
k
N Ο ∉ − ) 1 ( α  and we do not consider the non negativity 












2 ) 1 2 ( ) 1 ( − +
=
− −
= ,  N j∈ ∀             [ 2 8 ]  
is the unique equilibrium of system [24]. In the other cases, the SNE remains the unique equilibrium 
pattern if and only if specific conditions on  ) 1 ( α −  are satisfied. Moreover, as in the case of  1 = k , 
these conditions coincide with those which allow the SNE for being locally stable. In particular, the 
following proposition generalises the results of uniqueness and stability of the SNE stated in 
COR.1. to larger neighbourhoods:  
 
() () () () []
N N k
N x circulant A ℜ ℜ ∈ − − − − − − − − − = α α α α 1 ,..., 1 , 0 ,......, 0 , 1 ,..., 1 , 1
terms k terms k




N Ο  be the set of values of  ) 1 ( α −  included between 0 and 1 such that at least 
one eigenvalue of 
k
N A  is null. Let ( )
k
N a − 1  be the lowest value in 
k
N Ο . For any  1 > k  and for any 
2 2 + ≥ k N , the SNE is the unique equilibrium pattern and it is locally stable if and only if 
( )
k
N a − < − 1 ) 1 ( α . Moreover, if and only if 
k
N Ο ∉ − ) 1 ( α  and  ( )
k
N a − > − 1 ) 1 ( α , it is always possible 
to find a ANE which is locally stable. 
[Proof in appendix] 
 
Can we say anything else on the value of ( )
k
N a − 1 ? Unfortunately, when  1 > k  the  monotonic 
relation between ( )
k
N a − 1  and the number of individuals highlighted in LEMMA.1. no longer holds. 
However, the following property states, for any  1 ≥ k  and for any  2 2 + ≥ k N , the existence of a 
lower bound such that if  ) 1 ( α −  is greater than or equal to such a bound, then the SNE in not unique 
and unstable.  
 
PROP.6. For any  1 > k  and for any  2 2 + ≥ k N , if  2 / 1 ) 1 ( ≥ −α , then the SNE is not the unique 
equilibrium pattern and, moreover, it is unstable.  
[Proof in appendix] 
 
Finally, in order to identify a particular class of ANE patterns which are obtained by combining 
BBV communities of size 1 with BBV communities of size 2, we can extend PROP.4. to any  1 > k .  
 
PROP.7. For any  1 > k   and for any  2 2 + ≥ k N , if  61803 . 0 ) 1 ( ≥ −α  and 
k
N Ο ∉ − ) 1 ( α , then the 
generic combination of BBV communities of size 1 with BBV communities of size 2 which exhausts 
N  represents a locally stable ANE pattern. 
[Proof in appendix]   21
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCHES 
The statement “identical individuals contribute the same amount of resources” is the most natural 
and reasonable result of the traditional theory of private provision of public goods. Unfortunately, 
the real world induces public economists to be very sceptical with this implication. Voluntary 
contribution regimes clearly do generate unequal contributions from people who are equal in 
objective circumstances such as preferences and incomes. Could we use the framework of the 
traditional models to get rid of this embarrassing puzzle? Rather than introducing heterogeneity in 
preferences and incomes, I have shown that symmetry, uniqueness and stability which characterise 
the equilibrium pattern of contributions in the traditional models dramatically depend on the 
implicit hypothesis of “globally enjoyed” public goods. In particular, by introducing the Ellison’s 
“local interaction structure” (Ellison [1993]) in the BBV model (Bergstrom et al. [1986]) with 
agents who have identical homothetic preferences and are endowed with the same income, I have 
proved that: a) the SNE is the unique equilibrium pattern and it is locally stable if and only if the 
preferences are unrealistically biased towards the public good; b) all the other equilibrium patterns 
but the SNE are characterised by asymmetric contributions; c) if and only if the SNE is locally 
unstable, it is always possible to find a locally stable ANE pattern; d) the previous results hold for 
any size of the neighbourhood such that it does not include the entire population. 
It is possible to identify at least two aspects of my model which require further developments. 
Firstly, it could be interesting to analyse the results of uniqueness and stability of the SNE under 
different specifications of the utility function which satisfy the minimal requirements highlighted by 
BBV. Secondly, one could try to remove the assumption of identical individuals assuming either 
heterogeneous incomes or heterogeneous preferences. 
 
Luca Corazzini 




Proof of PROP.1. 
Let 
N BR q ℜ ∈  be the vector which contains the best responses functions of the N  contributors in the economy. 
BR q  
defines a continuous function from the compact and convex set  { } N j I x x j
N ,..., 1 , 0 : = ≤ ≤ ℜ ∈ = Ι  to itself. 
Therefore, by the Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem there must exist a fixed point  ) ,..., ( 1
e
N
e q q , which is a Nash 
equilibrium vector of contributions.                             ■ 
 
 
Proof of LEMMA.1. 
When N is even, the coordinates of the vertex 
2




even N λ  is 





even N λ ) is the smallest element 
in 
1




































 are the minor and the 
major integer of 
2
odd N
 respectively) are one the complex conjugate of the other and, moreover, they have the greatest 






















⎡ odd N λ  are the greatest eigenvalues and the value of  ) 1 ( α −  























⎡ odd odd N N λ λ  is the smallest element in
1
odd N Ο . Let us call this value ( )
1 1 odd N a − . Moreover, as 




















odd N w  get closer and closer to the vertex () 1 , 0 − . Therefore, the 
succession of ( )
1 1 odd N a −  is monotone decreasing in 









Proof of PROP.2. 
The equilibria of the “unconstrained” system [9] are obtained by imposing its LHS equal to zero, so that: 
0
1 = +
t N q A I µ µα              [ A 1 ]  
1 ) 1 ( N Ο ∈ − ∀ α , matrix 
1
N A  is not full rank. Therefore, [A1] has an infinite number of solutions which includes the 
SNE. 
1 ) 1 ( N Ο ∉ − ∀ α , matrix 
1
N A  is full rank. Therefore [A.1] has a unique solution which is equal to the SNE:   23
I A q N
e 1 1 ) (
− − = α              [ A 2 ]  
with 






Now, let us identify ANE patterns implied by the non negativity constraint. Suppose that the dimension of the 
population is 
even N . Consider the pattern in which  0 ...
) mod( ) 2 ( ) mod( ) 2 ( = = = =
− +
even even N j N j j q q q , and 
I q q q even even even N j N j N j α = = = =
− + + ) mod( ) 1 ( ) mod( ) 3 ( ) mod( ) 1 ( ... . Given 
) mod( ) 1 (
even N j q
−  and 
) mod( ) 1 (
even N j q
+ , the best reply 
function of individual j implies that  0 =
e
j q  if and only if   2 / 1 ) 1 ( ≥ −α . Therefore, if and only if  2 / 1 ) 1 ( < −α , 
the non negativity constraint does not bind and the SNE is the unique equilibrium pattern. Suppose that the dimension 
of the population is 
odd N  and  ( )




















. By solving the system composed by the  1 −
odd N  best response functions 
of the “unconstrained” contributors and the condition 
u
j q ϑ = , we find the expression of the equilibrium contributions 
odd N s∈ ∀  with  j s ≠ . Then, given  
e
N j q ) mod( ) 1 ( −  and 
e
N j q ) mod( ) 1 ( +  , the best response function of individual  j  implies 
that  ϑ =
e
j q   if and only if  ( )
1 1 ) 1 ( odd N a − = −α . The set of equilibrium contributions identifies a peak and hill 












, there exists an infinite number of 
equilibrium patterns of this type. Among them, consider the one such that the smallest local minima are represented by 
two null contributors. Because of the non negativity constraint, the condition on  ) 1 ( α −  such that this pattern is an 
ANE becomes  ( )












; 0 , we end up 
with a peak and hill equilibrium pattern with a downwards spike represented by a null contributor. The condition on 
) 1 ( α −  such that it is an equilibrium pattern is the same of the one obtained in the previous case. Among the two ANE 
we have identified, let us consider the one which presents the highest number of local minima without considering the 
plateau.
12   By induction we have that, if and only if ( ) ( )
1
5 1 ) 1 ( 1 odd N a a − ≥ − > − α , then  )' 1 ( α − ∃  with 
( ) () α α − > − ≥ − 1 )' 1 ( 1
1
5 a  such that it is possible to find an equilibrium pattern associated with  )' 1 ( α −  which 
presents at least one further null contributor. Indeed, the second smallest local minima are equal to zero if and only if 
( )
1
2 1 ) 1 (
− − ≥ − odd N a α , the third smallest local minima are equal to zero if and only if  ( )
1
2 1 ) 1 (
− − ≥ − odd N a α , and 
so on until  ( )
1
5 1 ) 1 ( a − = −α . When  ( )
1
5 1 ) 1 ( a − ≥ −α , then for any 
odd N , there always exists an equilibrium 
                                                 
12 For example, if  5 = N , a peak and hill equilibrium pattern with an upwards spike presents 2 local minima (without 
considering the plateau) while a peak and hill equilibrium pattern with a downwards spike presents 1 local minimum 
(without considering the plateau).   24




 BBV community of 
s i z e   1 .                                 ■ 
 
Proof of PROP.3. 
If and only if 
1 ) 1 ( N Ο ∈ −α , at least one eigenvalue of matrix 
1
N A   is null. Therefore we have an infinite number of 
unstable equilibrium patterns. If and only if 
1 ) 1 ( N Ο ∉ −α  and  either  2 / 1 ) 1 ( < −α   in the even case or 
( )
1 1 ) 1 ( odd N a − < −α  in the odd case, the SNE is the unique equilibrium pattern. In order to study the stability of the 
SNE, we directly study the sign of the eigenvalues of 
1
N A . LEMMA.1. implies that they are strictly negative. Therefore 
the SNE is locally stable. In order to study the stability properties of the equilibria when 
1 ) 1 ( N Ο ∉ −α  and either 
2 / 1 ) 1 ( > −α  in the even case or  ( )
1 1 ) 1 ( odd N a − > −α  in the odd case, we use the linearization procedure. Indeed, 
let us rewrite the generic differential equation of the dynamic system [11] as follows: 
{ } j N j N j
e
j j j q q q I q m q − + − − = + − )] )( 1 ( )[ ( ) mod( ) 1 ( ) mod( ) 1 ( α α µ &         [ A 3 ]  
where  ) (
e




N j q q I + − + − ≥ α α   and it is null if and only if 




N j q q I + − + − < α α . 
The generic equilibrium pattern  ) ,..., ( 1
e
N
e q q  is locally stable if and only if all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix 
evaluated in it are strictly negative. In particular, the Jacobian matrix  ) (
1 e
N q J  is a squared matrix of size N  such that 
its  j -th row is obtained by multiplying all the terms equal to  ) 1 ( α − −  which appear in the  j -th row of 
1
N A  by 
) (
e
j j q m . Let us consider the SNE. In this case the Jacobian matrix coincides with 
1
N A . Therefore, for 
1 ) 1 ( N Ο ∉ −α  
with either  2 / 1 ) 1 ( > −α  in the even case or  ( )
1 1 ) 1 ( odd N a − > −α   in the odd case, the SNE equilibrium is locally 
unstable. Now, suppose that the dimension of the population is 
odd N . Let us assume that 
odd N  is such that the 
configuration which presents the highest number of local minima without considering the plateau is a peak and hill 
equilibrium pattern with an upwards spike. As already said, if and only if ( ) ( )
1
2
1 1 ) 1 ( 1
− − < − ≤ − odd odd N N a a α , we 
can identify other two equilibria: a “peak and hill” equilibrium pattern with a downwards spike represented by a null 
contributor and a “peak and hill” equilibrium pattern with an upwards spike surrounded by two null contributors. The 
condition such that all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated in the first equilibrium pattern are strictly 
negative is  ( )
1 1 ) 1 ( odd N a − < −α  which clearly represents a contradiction. The condition such that all the eigenvalues 
of the Jacobian matrix evaluated in the second equilibrium pattern are strictly negative is  ( )
1
2 1 ) 1 (
− − < − odd N a α . 
Therefore, if and only if 
1 ) 1 ( odd N Ο ∉ −α  and ( ) ( )
1
2
1 1 ) 1 ( 1
− − < − < − odd odd N N a a α , a “peak and hill” equilibrium 
pattern with an upwards spike such that the first smallest local minima are represented by null contributors is locally 




2 1 ) 1 ( 1
− − − < − ≤ − odd odd N N a a α , we can identify a peak and 
hill equilibrium pattern with an upwards spike such that the first and the second smallest local minima are null. By   25
using the Jacobian matrix evaluated in this equilibrium pattern we have that the condition such that all the eigenvalues 
are strictly negative is  ( )
1
4 1 ) 1 (
− − < − odd N a α . Therefore, if and only if 
1 ) 1 ( odd N Ο ∉ −α  and 




2 1 ) 1 ( 1
− − − < − ≤ − odd odd N N a a α , a “peak and hill” equilibrium pattern with an upwards spike such that the first 
and the second smallest local minima are represented by null contributors is locally stable. The rest of the proof consists 
in repeating the same procedure letting  ) 1 ( α −  to  increase  until  ( )
1
5 1 a − . If and only if 
1 ) 1 ( odd N Ο ∉ −α  and 
( ) ) 1 ( 1
1
5 α − ≤ − a , the “peak and hill” pattern with an upwards spike such that all the local minima are equal to zero is 
locally stable. Suppose that the dimension of the population is 
even N . If and only if  2 / 1 ) 1 ( ≥ −α  we can identify an 
up and down equilibrium pattern composed by the combination of  2 /
even N  BBV community of size 1. By applying the 
linearisation procedure we can easily prove that this equilibrium pattern is locally stable if and only if 
1 ) 1 ( even N Ο ∉ −α  
and  2 / 1 ) 1 ( > −α .              ■ 
 
 
Proof of PROP.4. 
Firstly, let us prove that an equilibrium pattern cannot contain two consecutive BBV communities of size 2. Let C  be a 








) 1 ( − −
= ,  C j∈ ∀             [ A 4 ]  








= = + − 2
) mod( ) 1 ( ) mod( ) 1 ( , we have that the best response function of individual x  implies  0 =
e
x q  if 





2 . The previous condition is satisfied when  0 ≤ α  which is impossible.             
Secondly, let us prove that if  1 = k , then,  61803 . 0 ) 1 ( ≥ − ∀ α  such that 
1 ) 1 ( N Ο ∉ −α  and  4 ≥ ∀N , the generic 
combination of BBV communities of size 1 with BBV communities of size 2 which exhausts N  and such that it does not 
present two or more consecutive BBV communities of size 2 represents a locally stable ANE pattern. When the size of 
the population is such that it can be decomposed into BBV communities of size 1 exclusively, then the neighbourhood of 
the generic null contributor b  is composed by two individuals who belong to a BBV community of size 1. By using the 
best response function of individualb , we obtain that  0 = b q  if and only if  5 . 0 ) 1 ( ≥ −α . When the size of the 
population is such that it cannot be decomposed into BBV communities of size 1  exclusively, we can always find a 
combination of BBV communities of size 1  with BBV communities of size 2  which exhausts N  and such that it does 
not present two or more consecutive BBV communities of size 2 . Any of these combinations is characterised by the 
presence of at least one individual x  such that: a) he is a null contributor; b) his neighbourhood is composed by 
himself, an individual who belongs to a BBV community of size 1 and, finally, an individual who belongs to BBV 
community of size 2. Note that, among the null contributors who separate a BBV community of size 1 form a BBV   26
community of size 2, we have that  j N x N j x Q Q − − ≤ ,  N j∈ ∀  with  x j ≠ . By using the best response function of 
individual x , we obtain that  0 =
e
x q   if and only if  61803 . 0 ) 1 ( ≥ −α . Finally, by using the linearisation procedure 
presented in the proof of PROP.3., we have that,  61803 . 0 ) 1 ( ≥ − ∀ α  such that 
1 ) 1 ( N Ο ∉ −α , any combination of 
BBV communities of size 1 with BBV communities of size 2 which exhausts N  and which does not present two or more 
consecutive BBV communities of size 2  is locally stable.                       ■ 
 
 
Proof of PROP.5. 
k
N Ο ∈ − ∀ ) 1 ( α , we have an infinite number of ANE patterns in addition to the SNE. In this case, there is not any 
locally stable equilibrium pattern.  
k
N Ο ∉ − ∀ ) 1 ( α , the SNE is the unique solution of system [24]. In order to find other equilibria patterns implied by 
the non negativity constraint, let us replicate the procedure presented in PROP.2. Starting from the SNE associated with 
() ( )
k






2 ) 1 2 ( − +
=  to 
u














2 ) 1 2 (
. By solving the system composed by the  1 − N   best response functions of the 
“unconstrained” individuals and the condition 
u
j q ϑ = , we find the expression of the equilibrium contributions 
N s∈ ∀  with  j s ≠ . Then, by using the equilibrium contributions of the individuals who belong to  j ’s  
neighbourhood, expression [6] implies that 
u e
j q ϑ =  if and only if  ( )
k
N a − = − 1 ) 1 ( α . Therefore, we have identified 














2 ) 1 2 (
, we have an infinite number of equilibrium patterns of this type. Let 
u ϑ  
increase until the smallest local minimum of the pattern of contributions gets value zero. Let us call this pattern 
u l .  
Because of the non negativity constraint, the condition on  ) 1 ( α −  such  that 
u l   is an ANE becomes 
( )
k













2 ) 1 2 (
; 0 , we find another ANE with 
null contributors as smallest local minima, 
d l , which is implied by the condition  ( )
k
N a − ≥ − 1 ) 1 ( α . By applying the 
linearisation procedure, we have that if and only if 
k
N Ο ∉ − ) 1 ( α  and  ( )
k
N a − > − 1 ) 1 ( α , one and only one between 
u l  and 
d l  is locally stable since all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix evaluated in it are strictly negative. In 
particular, the Jacobian matrix  ) (
e k
N q J   is a squared matrix of size N   such that its  j -th row is obtained by 
multiplying all the terms equal to  ) 1 ( α − −  which appear in the  j -th row of 
k
N A  by  ) (
e
j j q m . Starting from the 




N a a − ≥ − > − 1 ) 1 ( 1 α , then   27
)' 1 ( α − ∃  with ( ) ) 1 ( )' 1 ( 1 α α − > − ≥ −
k
N a  such that the equilibrium pattern associated with  )' 1 ( α −  presents at 
least one further null contributor, where ( )
k
N a − 1  is the highest value of  ) 1 ( α −  such that  ( )
k
N a − > − ∀ 1 ) 1 ( α  the 
number of null contributors associated with () α − 1  is the same of the one associated with ( )
k
N a − 1 . By applying the 
linearisation procedure, we have that the equilibrium patterns identified by induction are locally stable if and only if 
k
N Ο ∉ − ) 1 ( α  and the conditions on () α − 1  such that they are equilibria are satisfied. Finally, the SNE equilibrium 
is locally stable if and only if the eigenvalues of matrix
k
N A   are strictly negative which holds if and only if 
( )
k
N a − < − 1 ) 1 ( α .                                     ■ 
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   [A6] 
Therefore, by combining equation [A6] with the expression of the generic eigenvalue  1 + j λ , we obtain: 
()





) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 β α α
β
β
α α λ g
k













− − − + − = +       [ A 7 ]  
Suppose for the sake of simplicity that the parameter  j  is a real variable. It is clear that, in order to maximise  1 + j λ  
with respect  j , we have to minimise the expression  ) (β g . Apart from a pure numerical factor, the function  ) (β g  is 
a Dirichlet kernel of order k  and its minimum value is attained at its first local minimum. Using standard calculus 
techniques, we have to solve the following equation: 
2
tan ) 1 2 (
2
) 1 2 tan(
0
2






) 1 2 cos( ) 1 2 ( 0
) (
β β
β β β β
β
β
+ = + ⇔






      [ A 8 ]  
Let us define the minimum point  m β . Then:   28
) 1 2 (
2












            [ A 9 ]  
Using the trigonometric relations, we have: 
2
) 1 2 ( sin
2
) 1 2 ( cos ) 1 2 (
2
) 1 2 tan(
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) 1 2 (
2
) 1 2 ( tan
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=          [A10] 
and coming back to  ) (β g , we obtain: 
1
2
) 1 2 ( cos ) 4 4 (
2
) 1 2 tan(
2
) 1 2 cos(
2
) 1 2 ( sin
2
) 1 2 ( cos ) 1 2 (
2
) 1 2 ( tan 1
2
) 1 2 tan(
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               [A11] 
We conclude that:  
1
2
) 1 2 ( cos ) 4 4 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 max
2 2






α α λ                    [A12] 
Thanks to the properties of both  ) (β g  and the tan function, we have that the first non trivial root (different from zero) 
of [A8] is included in the set  ] 2 / 3 , [ π π . Therefore, given the periodicity of the tangent function we obtain: 
) 1 2 ( 2
3





m π β π
                             [A13] 
By combining the previous condition with [A12], we obtain both an upper bond and a lower bond for the greatest 
eigenvalue: 
) 1 2 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 max ) 1 ( 2 1 1 + − + − + − ≤ ≤ − + − + k j
j
α α λ α                      [A14] 
From the LHS of [A14] we have that  0 max 1 ≥ + j
j
λ   if and only if  2 / 1 ) 1 ( ≥ −α . Therefore, if and only if 
2 / 1 ) 1 ( ≥ −α , the SNE is both not unique and unstable.                                  ■ 
 
 
Proof of PROP.7. 
The proof of PROP.7. is very similar to that of PROP.4. The only difference consists of the fact 
that, for  1 > k , an ANE can present two consecutive BBV communities of size 2. Indeed, consider a 
combination which presents two consecutive BBV communities of size 2 and at least one BBV 
community of size 1. Then, it has to be characterised by the presence of at least one individual x 
and at least k  individuals s such that: a) they are both null contributors; b) x’s neighbourhood is   29
composed by himself, an individual who belongs to a BBV community of size 1, an individual who 
belongs to a BBV community of size 2 and  ) 1 ( 2 − k  null contributors while s’s neighbourhood is 
composed by himself, 3 individuals who belong to BBV communities of size 2 and  3 2 − k  null 
contributors. From the previous consideration, it follows that  s N x N s x Q Q − − ≤ . Therefore, among the 
null contributors who separate a BBV community of size 1 form a BBV community of size 2, we 
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